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Outlaw emotions are emotions that stand in tension with one’s wider belief 
system, often allowing epistemic insight one may have otherwise lacked. Outlaw 
emotions are thought to play crucial epistemic roles under conditions of 
oppression. Although the crucial epistemic value of these emotions is widely 
acknowledged, specific accounts of their epistemic role(s) remain largely 
programmatic. There are two dominant accounts of the epistemic role of 
emotions: The Motivational View and the Justificatory View. Philosophers of 
emotion assume that these dominant ways of accounting for the epistemic role(s) 
of emotions in general are equipped to account for the epistemic role(s) of outlaw 
emotions. I argue that this is not the case. I consider and dismiss two responses 
that could be made on behalf of the most promising account, the Justificatory 
View, in light of my argument, before sketching an alternative account that 
should be favoured.  
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1. Introduction 
Outlaw emotions are emotions that stand in tension with a large set of an agent’s beliefs. 
They are recalcitrant emotions, as they conflict with the agent’s evaluative judgements, 
but they are not merely recalcitrant. In typical cases of recalcitrant emotion, such as fear 
of a dog that one believes is not dangerous, there need be only one belief that the emotion 
conflicts with.1 In outlaw emotion cases, although there is typically a belief with which 
the emotion conflicts, making the emotion recalcitrant, the emotion stands also in tension 
                                                        
1 On emotional recalcitrance see Brady (2009) and Döring (2015). 
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with a large set of further beliefs, often clashing with an agent’s wider belief system. This 
is what makes this class of emotions distinctive. Outlaw emotions are prevalent under 
conditions of oppression.2 Consider the following two cases:  
 
      Discontent Housewife: 
A woman who has been taught that a ‘woman’s place is in the home’ may be 
driven to question this maxim precisely in light of her persistent dissatisfactions 
and repeated urges to flee from the responsibilities and limitations which 
structure her domestic life… if her highest principles themselves also include 
notions of ‘appropriate’ sex roles, duties to others and the importance of self-
sacrifice as an ideal of femininity, then there is not much available among her 
highest principles to afford an independent standpoint for assessing the maxim 
about woman’s place. Her frustration, grief, and depression, and the 
motivations to change her life which spring from these sources, may be her 
only reliable guides. (Friedman, 1986: 31) 
 
      Harassment:  
Raquel is a woman living under conditions of gender oppression in which the 
concept of sexual harassment is not available. Raquel is on a night out with a 
group of girlfriends. She feels someone squeeze part of her body and turns to 
see a man she has never met before. The man smiles at Raquel in 
acknowledgement of having been the person to touch her, and walks away. 
Some of Raquel’s friends feel excited by what just happened, and encourage 
                                                        
2 I understand oppression as a social injustice, that is to say that it is perpetrated through social institutions, 
practices, and norms. Certain social groups are systematically and unjustifiably disadvantaged by oppression, 
while other groups benefit from it.  
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her to go talk to the man. Others aren’t excited but jealous for not having been 
the ones squeezed. Raquel believes she should be flattered by the attention she 
has received, as well as proud to have been the one approached, and indeed she 
does feel a mixture of these emotions, but she also feels uneasy and angry. 
Raquel forms the belief that what the man did was not ok, based on her negative 
emotional responses, despite this belief going against her wider set of beliefs 
and emotional responses, as well as those of her peers.  
 
Jaggar (1989) coined the term ‘outlaw emotion’ to capture those emotions ‘distinguished 
by their incompatibility with the dominant perceptions and values’ (166) that agents have 
internalized.3 At least sometimes outlaw emotions will be better guides to truth than those 
beliefs with which they stand in tension. This seems to be what is going on in the example 
cases above. The agents in these cases are getting something right about reality, and they 
are doing so despite having internalized oppressive ideology.4 These example cases can 
be seen to involve appropriate, or fitting,5 recalcitrant emotions that occur under 
                                                        
3 Although Jaggar (1989) is concerned with outlaw emotions occurring under conditions of oppression, the 
term seems to encompass a wider class of emotions. Outlaw emotions can occur in agents that have internalized 
non-oppressive ideology (emotions that conflict with egalitarian values for example), as well as in agents who 
hold a large set of beliefs we might think aren’t characteristic of a particular ideology (a self-purported and 
devoted ‘nature-lover’ who feels frustrated and bored in the great outdoors, for example, arguably experiences 
outlaw emotions). In the present paper I follow the philosophical literature in focusing on outlaw emotions 
that occur under conditions of oppression. 
4 By ‘internalization’ I mean the psychological phenomenon occurring when a person comes to believe 
prejudices and biases regarding identity groups, even when these are groups to which they themselves belong 
(see David 2013). Agents that have internalized such beliefs will be disposed to experience emotions in line 
with them. Outlaw emotions escape this trend. 
5 The thought that emotions are responsive to reasons is widespread in moral philosophy (Skorupski 2010; Raz 
2011; Scanlon 2014), feminist philosophy (Frye 1983; Jaggar 1989; Fricker 1991; Lorde 1981; Jones 2003; Bell 
2009) and philosophy of emotion (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000; Solomon 2003; Deonna and Teroni 2012b; 
Tappolet 2016). It is therefore common to think of emotions as amenable to normative assessment, such that 
some emotions are appropriate while others are not. Emotions are appropriate when there are reasons for 
them. Assessments of appropriateness equivocate over two distinct types of normative assessment however 
(D’Arms and Jacobson 2000). An emotion can be appropriate in the sense that it is accurate, or fitting, with 
respect to an evaluative state of affairs, but the very same emotion can be inappropriate in a moral, or all things 
considered sense (for example, it might be inappropriate to laugh during an academic talk, even though your 
friend’s whispered comment was funny). Whether there are reasons for the emotion in the fittingness or 
accuracy sense is therefore typically separate from whether social or moral considerations count for or against 
the emotion. In what follows, I am concerned with the fittingness, or accuracy, sense of appropriateness, such 
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conditions of oppression.6 Feminist philosophers have argued that outlaw emotions 
occurring under conditions of oppression often play crucial and radical epistemic roles 
by responding to reasons the agent may have otherwise not tracked, given that reasoning 
would tend to favour the conflicting oppressive beliefs (Friedman 1986; Narayan 1988; 
Sue Campbell 1994). Raquel’s belief that ‘what the man did is not ok’ seems justified, 
and it is her outlaw anger that seems to provide this justification. I focus on such cases 
throughout, and use the term ‘outlaw emotion’ to refer to ‘outlaw emotions that occur 
under conditions of oppression’ for simplicity. I will refer to the beliefs that outlaw 
emotions stand in potentially justificatory relations to as ‘outlaw beliefs’ throughout. 
 
First personal experience of outlaw emotions can be disorientating as agents often lack 
the resources to name or interpret their experience. In cases where these emotions are 
more readily made sense of, agents will often experience cognitive and/or affective 
conflict, given that these emotions stand in tension with their wider set of beliefs. I will 
take for granted in what follows that outlaw emotions form a sufficiently cohesive class 
of emotions to permit inquiry into their epistemic role. Additionally, following most 
discussion on emotions in general, I focus on occurrent and intentional cases of outlaw 
emotions such as the ones illustrated in the above cases.  
                                                        
that by ‘reasons for emotions’ I mean those considerations that make an emotion fitting, rather than those that 
might bear on the prudential or moral status of the emotion. The reasons that bear on the fittingness or accuracy 
of emotions are given by the formal object, or evaluative property, characteristic of each emotion type. Reasons 
for danger make fear fitting while reasons for offence make anger fitting, for example (see Kenny 1963; Teroni 
2007).  
6 Note that outlaw emotions occurring under conditions of oppression can be in fact unfitting. For example, if 
Raquel was squeezed accidently (in an excusable way, perhaps by a visually impaired man groping around in 
the dark), her anger would arguably be unfitting despite conflicting with sexist ideology. Similarly, a woman 
living under gender oppression can feel an outlaw emotion of pride at having behaved in a manner that she 
follows convention in believing condemnable of her gender, but if this behaviour is not in fact praise-worthy 
her pride will be unfitting (for example if a female academic feels pride at having shut down a junior colleague 
in a public and aggressive manner). My argument, much like those views I critique, does not assume that 
emotional fittingness is a condition on emotions being able to play epistemic roles (Raquel’s unfitting anger 
may lead to the justification of a false belief for example). 
Forthcoming in Ergo 
 5 
We need not be committed to the implausible view that outlaw emotions always track 
reasons, nor that they always do so better than our belief systems, so as to accept their 
epistemic value. We need only hold that sometimes emotions better track reasons than 
our belief systems do. To deny this weaker claim would be to deny the role of 
consciousness raising, where collective efforts to make sense of emotional experiences 
shared across groups led to critical progress (Fricker 1991; 2007; Thompson 2006). It 
would also be to deny the common phenomenon of feeling a certain way, while not 
knowing exactly why, and later coming to realize one’s feelings were justified. Indeed, 
the thought that emotions sometimes better track reasons than our belief systems do is 
prevalent within the philosophy of emotion, as well as the philosophy of action, where 
emotions are common motivators of rational akrasia (see MacIntyre 1990; Arpaly 2000; 
Tappolet 2016).  
 
In what follows, I take for granted that outlaw emotions are epistemically important. This 
point is, by and large, uncontentious. Specific accounts of how outlaw emotions play 
epistemic roles remain largely programmatic in the work of those who highlight their 
epistemic value. In contemporary philosophy of emotion, on the other hand, there is active 
debate over the epistemic roles played by emotions in general, but outlaw emotions have 
not received sustained attention. Due to this, it is often assumed that the dominant ways 
of accounting for the epistemic roles of emotions in general will be able to account for 
outlaw emotion cases as well. The specific assumption in the literature is that existing 
accounts can capture outlaw beliefs, such as ‘what the man did was not ok’ in 
Harassment, as justified (Deonna and Teroni 2012a; Tappolet 2014, 2018; Sreenivasan 
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2018; Arpaly 2018).7 We will see that the epistemic role envisioned can be more or less 
direct, depending on which view of the epistemic role of emotions is favoured. I argue 
that existing accounts, which I call the Motivational and the Justificatory view 
respectively, struggle to deliver the relevant propositions, outlaw beliefs, as justified in 
outlaw emotion cases. This should worry us as, contrary to claims in the literature, we are 
left without an account that can capture beliefs such as Raquel’s in Harassment as 
justified. I end by sketching an alternative view that is promising with regards to its ability 
to remedy this.  
 
2. Motivation and Justification  
In Discontent Housewife, the outlaw emotions are ‘persistent’ and ‘repeated’ urges that 
motivate the agent to question her oppressive beliefs. Outlaw emotions seem here to be 
motivating the agent to assess her current beliefs about a woman’s place in the home. 
This assessment likely involves the outlaw emotions motivating inquiry into why one is 
experiencing the relevant emotion. In Harassment too, Raquel’s anger will likely 
motivate her to think about why she has responded so differently to the man’s actions, as 
compared to her friends. Raquel’s anger, in fueling a search for its reasons, is liable to 
challenge her conflicting emotional dispositions and wider set of oppressive beliefs. This 
motivational epistemic role can be summarized as follows:  
 
Motivational View (MV): Emotions motivate agents to search for the reasons for 
their emotions. 
                                                        
7 I follow others in focusing on propositional justification throughout (Cowan 2016; Carter 2019). For ease of 
exposition and consideration of example cases, what follows is put in terms that might at times seem to refer 
to doxastic justification. However, it is propositional justification that we are concerned with throughout. (See 
also fn.9).  
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Brady (2013) has been MV’s most vocal advocate. He holds that in capturing and 
consuming our attention, emotions motivate search for reasons that could justify our 
emotional responses. Those reasons that are uncovered can also provide justification for 
evaluative beliefs about the world. This is an epistemic role that should not be 
underestimated. By fueling reflection and inquiry that uncovers motivations and reasons 
for valuing certain actions and aims, our emotions are likely to play key roles in gaining 
evaluative knowledge and understanding.8 In outlaw emotion cases this motivational role 
seems paramount, for there is much to uncover, and many obstacles to doing so given the 
internalization of oppressive ideology. Having strong and persistent motivations to 
question one’s beliefs and search for the reasons for one’s emotions seems crucial. On 
MV, outlaw emotions motivate much needed inquiry, and it is this inquiry that uncovers 
reasons that can then provide justification for outlaw beliefs, such as Raquel’s belief that 
‘what the man did was not ok’. Outlaw emotions contribute in this crucial yet indirect 
manner to the justification of outlaw beliefs on MV. 
 
A separate view does not deny this motivational role, but holds that emotions also play a 
more direct epistemic role. Emotions can themselves, on this view, justify evaluative 
beliefs. I call this the Justificatory View. In becoming angry, Raquel may well be 
motivated to inquire into the reasons for her emotion, but simply by experiencing it, she 
is experiencing the man’s actions as problematic, even if she doesn’t understand why. 
                                                        
8 Brady (2013) takes the epistemic goal of emotions to be understanding as opposed to knowledge, where 
understanding involves grasping reasons, connections and causes, while knowledge need not. Brady (2013) is 
one of the Justificatory View’s strongest opponents, as he argues against the view that emotions provide 
immediate justification for evaluative beliefs. On Brady’s view, emotions contribute to the justification of 
evaluative beliefs indirectly, by motivating inquiry that uncovers reasons for emotions. It is these reasons, rather 
than the emotion itself, that can provide justification for the relevant evaluative beliefs on Brady’s account. 
Crucially however, Brady thinks that by uncovering reasons for emotions, the agent does not merely gain 
justification for beliefs (contributing to knowledge), but grasps explanatory and coherence relations 
characteristic of the more valuable epistemic goal of understanding. 
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Raquel and her friends perceive the event in different ways given their distinct emotional 
responses. That the event emotionally strikes Raquel as wrong is sufficient to defeasibly 
justify the belief that she has been wronged, according to some (Johnston 2001; de Sousa 
2007; Döring 2007; Tappolet 2016; Cowan 2016). This view can be summarized as 
follows:  
 
Justificatory View (JV): Emotions provide immediate defeasible propositional 
justification for evaluative beliefs.9  
 
The evaluative beliefs we are concerned with are those which have a similar content to 
the outlaw emotions. Typically, these beliefs have the form ‘x is F’ where x is the object 
of the emotion, and F is some evaluative property attributed to the object. The 
propositions in question spell out in conceptual terms what we take to feature in the 
representational content of the emotion.10 JV is most often endorsed by Perceptual 
Theorists, who take analogies with perception to be central to understanding emotions 
(Johnston 2001; de Sousa 2007; Döring 2007; Tappolet 2016; Cowan 2016).11 An 
epistemic analogy with perception is typically appealed to whereby emotions, like 
perceptual experiences (on standard accounts), are themselves sufficient to defeasibly 
justify relevant propositions. Emotions, on this view, stand to the relevant evaluative 
                                                        
9 JV claims that emotions provide immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions. It should be 
noted however that most proponents of JV also take emotions to at least sometimes provide doxastic 
justification for beliefs (Cowan 2016; Tappolet 2016). As propositional justification is typically thought to be 
required for doxastic justification, focus on the former seems warranted, and we will be concerned with 
propositional justification throughout.  
10 Most philosophers of emotion take emotions to have evaluative content of some sort, be it conceptual 
evaluative content for judgement theorists or non-conceptual evaluative content for perceptual theorists. 
Deonna and Teroni’s (2012b) Attitudinal theory is proposed as deviating from this trend, but it has been argued 
that even their view does not escape postulating evaluative content of emotions (see Tappolet and Rossi 2019).  
11 What I call the Justificatory View has been called ‘Epistemic Perceptualism’ due to its connection with 
Perceptual theories of emotion (Cowan 2016; Carter 2019), but has also gone by ‘justification thesis’ (Pelser 
2014), the ‘justification view’ (Mitchell 2017), and ‘epistemic dogmatism’ (Berit and Elijah 2016). 
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beliefs, as perceptual experiences stand to the relevant empirical beliefs. That you 
perceive a ball to be red gives you defeasible reason to believe that the ball is red, much 
as your experience of fear gives you defeasible reason to believe the object of your fear 
is dangerous.  
 
It is likely that in outlaw emotion cases, where conceptual resources relevant to one’s 
experience are typically underdeveloped, the content of the evaluative beliefs will be 
somewhat vaguer than in other, non-outlaw, cases where thick evaluative concepts are 
available. Further inquiry into the representational content of these emotions is, I think, 
called for. I cannot pursue this inquiry here. For current purposes I take the content of 
outlaw emotions to be sufficiently determinate such as to at least stand in potentially 
justificatory relations to propositions with vague evaluative content such as ‘what that 
man did was not ok’, as opposed to ‘that man sexually harassed me’. It is plausible that a 
given outlaw emotion can defeasibly justify a range of closely related evaluative beliefs. 
In Raquel’s case, for example, her anger could defeasibly justify the belief that ‘that man 
has harmed me’, or ‘what that man did was not nice’, and variations on these.  
 
JV comes in two main varieties, Reliabilism and Phenomenalism.12 For Reliabilism, it is 
the claimed reliability of emotions in generating true beliefs that accounts for their 
justification conferring capacities (see Pelser 2014), while for Phenomenalism, it is the 
phenomenology of emotional experiences that account for their justification conferring 
capacities (see Tappolet 2016). JV can therefore come in versions that vary in their 
alignment with epistemic externalism (Reliabilism) or internalism (Phenomenalism). 
Whichever variety one prefers, JV seems particularly well placed to account for a direct 
                                                        
12 See Cowan (2016). 
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epistemic role in outlaw emotion cases. If emotions provide immediate defeasible 
justification, no further beliefs, for example regarding the reasons for one’s emotion, or 
the reliability of one’s emotional experience, are required for the justification of an outlaw 
belief. This fits outlaw emotion cases well, as these are cases where the agent may feel 
confused by the very experience of the outlaw emotion, not understanding why they are 
feeling this way. Indeed this view has been advocated as ideally suited to account for 
outlaw emotion cases where non-emotional access to one’s reasons is typically lacking 
(see Tappolet 2014).13 
 
The motivational and the justificatory views capture the two main ways of thinking about 
the epistemic role of emotions in general, 14 and are similar to the roles mentioned by 
Jaggar (1989) concerning outlaw emotions specifically:  
 
The most obvious way in which feminist and other outlaw emotions can help in 
developing alternatives to prevailing conceptions of reality is by motivating new 
investigations… As well as motivating critical research, outlaw emotions may also 
enable us to perceive the world differently from its portrayal in conventional 
descriptions. (emphasis my own, 167) 
 
                                                        
13 Objections have been raised against JV (Brady 2013; Berit and Elijah 2016), and responses to them issued 
(Pelser 2014; Cowan 2016; Mitchell 2017; Tappolet 2018; Carter 2019). JV remains a popular and dominant 
view. I will not be concerned with defending JV here, I am granting that it enjoys at least moderate success in 
accounting for the epistemic role of emotions in general, my question is whether the view can, as some of its 
proponents claim, deliver justified outlaw beliefs in outlaw emotion cases. The problems that I will argue JV 
faces are distinct from all previous objections that have been raised against the view.   
14 There is an important, indirect, epistemic role that emotions can play under conditions of oppression which 
will not be my focus. By observing where and when one’s emotions are denied ‘uptake’, or not taken seriously, 
as claims about the world, an agent can map their oppression. According to Frye (1983), cartographies of 
oppression can be developed through such observation. For example: if a woman’s anger is taken seriously 
when it pertains to issues in the kitchen, or other household concerns, but not taken seriously with regard to 
political concerns, or in the bedroom, these facts inform the emoting agent about the nature of their oppression.  
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But whether and how exactly outlaw emotions might play these epistemic roles has not 
been examined. MV and JV have been asymmetrically related, that is, proponents of the 
motivational view typically deny that emotions play justificatory roles, while proponents 
of the justificatory view typically do not deny that emotions also play a motivational 
epistemic role.15 I begin by arguing that although the motivational view captures an 
important epistemic role that outlaw emotions play, it only manages to secure these 
emotions a limited, and indirect, role, such that the view struggles to deliver justified 
outlaw beliefs in outlaw emotion cases. The ways in which MV falls short invites the 
justificatory view to account for the direct epistemic role outlaw emotions seem to play. 
As the justificatory view appears ideally equipped to account for outlaw emotion cases, I 
will spend more time dissecting the obstacles it faces. I argue that on JV, as it currently 
stands, the justification of outlaw beliefs is always defeated in outlaw emotion cases. I 
consider two lines of response to my argument on behalf of the justificatory view, before 
sketching a more promising alternative view that preserves JV’s main insight. 
 
3. Limitations of the Motivational View  
That emotions often motivate agents to inquire is not contentious. But this motivational 
epistemic role falls short of an account of the epistemic role assumed of outlaw emotions 
for two main reasons: inquiry in outlaw emotion cases is both compromised, as well as 
particularly demanding. Due to this, we will see that the motivational view has a hard 
time delivering on the assumption that outlaw beliefs are justified. This would mean that 
Raquel’s belief in Harassment, that ‘what the man did was not ok’, is unjustified. 
 
                                                        
15 This is a claim about how the views relate to one another in the literature on the epistemology of emotion. 
There is of course nothing inherent to the motivational view, as I’ve stated it, that excludes emotions from also 
playing a justificatory epistemic role.  
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First, outlaw emotion cases are one’s where inquiry will be compromised by the 
internalization of oppressive ideology. Outlaw emotions can seem alien to the emoting 
individual themself, and their best efforts at making sense of their experience may fail. If 
the agent felt an emotion unrelated to dominant ideology this need not be the case, but 
because in outlaw emotion cases the emotion concerns exactly the domain over which the 
agent is susceptible to oppressive ideology, their ability to reflectively understand their 
emotion, at least on a short time scale, is compromised. Emotion-motivated inquiry is 
therefore less likely to yield reliable results in outlaw emotion cases. As Jaggar (1989) 
writes: 
When unconventional emotional responses are experienced by isolated 
individuals, those concerned may be confused, unable to name their experience; 
they may even doubt their own sanity. Women may come to believe that they are 
'emotionally disturbed' and that the embarrassment or fear aroused in them by 
male sexual innuendo is prudery or paranoia. (166) 
 
Second, when inquiry in outlaw emotion cases is not entirely blocked, we can expect it 
to be far more laboursome than in other scenarios. We can expect outlaw emotion-
motivated inquiry to not only require a longer time span to yield potential results, but to 
also rely on factors beyond the emoting agent and their immediate environment. To this 
effect Jaggar (1989) adds that:    
 
When certain emotions are shared or validated by others, however, the basis 
exists for forming a subculture defined by perceptions, norms, and values that 
systematically oppose the prevailing perceptions, norms, and values. (166) 
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The capacity for outlaw emotion-motivated inquiry to yield epistemic fruits is likely to 
depend on the agent interacting with others that experience similar emotions, where this 
interaction may involve long and difficult work untangling shared experience. As MV 
currently construes inquiry primarily as an individual endeavor (Brady 2013), as it stands, 
the view falls short at accounting for the relevant motivational epistemic role outlaw 
emotions play. Although Raquel’s anger may have a crucial motivational role to play in 
starting inquiry then, this inquiry is unlikely to deliver epistemic fruits in the short-term, 
due to inquiry being compromised by oppressive ideology, or in the long-run, so long as 
MV makes no reference to interaction with other agents as a feature of the inquiry 
envisioned. On the motivational view then, the epistemic role of outlaw emotions is 
important, but it is significantly limited by features of such cases.  
 
More problematically, however, even if MV were modified in an attempt to remedy this, 
the view would still be hard pressed to deliver on the assumption that outlaw beliefs are 
justified in outlaw emotion cases. Recall that proponents of MV typically deny JV by 
holding that emotions only play motivational epistemic roles, and cannot, themselves, 
justify evaluative beliefs. MV demands that the agent access the reasons for her emotion 
non-emotionally for these reasons to themselves play justificatory roles. On a 
motivational view, the justification of Raquel’s belief that ‘what the man did was not ok’ 
is dependent on the potential fruits of a compromised and particularly laboursome 
inquiry. Only if, and when, the results of this inquiry are available to Raquel, will her 
outlaw belief be, on this view, justified.16  
 
                                                        
16 The prospects of including an internalist counterfactual condition on justification are discussed in section 
4.1. 
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This overly demanding account of the justification is one of MV’s greatest shortcomings. 
JV, on the other hand, grants emotions a direct justificatory role, as emotions can be taken 
at face value in the justification of beliefs. I will devote more attention to JV for this 
reason, as this makes it seemingly ideally placed to account for outlaw emotion cases. 
For now, it should be clear that while MV grants outlaw emotions a crucial epistemic role 
in triggering much-needed inquiry, this inquiry will be especially compromised and 
laboursome in ways that MV, as it stands, is ill-equipped to account for. Moreover, as 
MV grants emotions only an indirect role in the justification of beliefs, outlaw beliefs will 
remain unjustified less the emotion-motivated inquiry is successful. A view that allows 
an immediate epistemic role of outlaw emotions, such that need for inquiry is bypassed, 
seems called for. 
 
4. A Problem for the Justificatory View 
JV seems to deliver where MV falls short. It grants emotions themselves justificatory 
force, such that no search for reasons, nor any further beliefs, or inferences, are needed 
for the defeasible justification of outlaw beliefs. This view has strong intuitive appeal, for 
we tend to quickly form beliefs based on our emotions, and take their content for granted 
until disconfirming evidence is made apparent. The undemanding nature of JV makes it 
seem particularly well-suited to account for outlaw emotion cases where agents typically 
lack access to the reasons for their emotions. Indeed, proponents of JV have argued that 
it is a virtue of their view that they can accommodate outlaw emotion cases such as 
Friedman’s (1986) Discontent Housewife (Tappolet 2014). Recall that on JV nothing 
besides the emotion is required to ensure this justificatory relation. All that is required for 
the justification of Raquel’s belief that ‘what the man did was not ok’, is that Raquel 
experience outlaw anger, and that no defeaters be at play.    
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JV’s appeal in accounting for outlaw emotion cases is, I argue, unfortunately merely 
apparent, due to an underappreciated feature of the view. JV says that outlaw beliefs will 
not be justified if there are defeaters present, as these would defeat the justification 
conferred by the emotion. But in outlaw emotion cases, agents have internalized a vast 
range of beliefs that stand in tension with the emotion. These beliefs are likely to include 
both rebutting as well as undercutting defeaters (Pollock 1986). Patriarchal societies are 
often characterized by a dismissal of emotions as inherently irrational and tied to the 
subjugated feminine (Jaggar 1989; Fricker 1991). The two example cases above involve 
gender oppression, making it likely that the agents portrayed in them believe their 
emotions to be unreliable means of acquiring knowledge. These beliefs could undercut 
the justification conferred by outlaw emotions. While the presence of these undercutting 
defeaters is contingent on the particular modes of oppression at play in a given case, the 
presence of rebutting defeaters seems to be built into all outlaw emotion cases. Recall that 
Raquel, for example, has internalized beliefs that she should be flattered, she believes the 
man’s actions are desirable. She therefore believes that the man’s actions are (more than) 
ok. This oppressive belief conflicts with her outlaw belief that ‘what the man did was not 
ok’, and is liable to act as a rebutting defeater against its justification. This worry can be 
summarized as follows:  
 
P1: JV claims that emotions are a source of immediate defeasible propositional 
justification for evaluative beliefs.  
P2: Outlaw emotion cases involve rebutting defeaters.  
P3: If P1 and P2, the justification of outlaw beliefs is always defeated on JV. 
___________________________________________ 
C: The justification of outlaw beliefs is always defeated on JV. 
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The following options are available to a proponent of JV in response to this argument: 
 
1) Drop JV’s defeatism commitment. 
2) Drop JV’s immediacy component.  
3) Accept the conclusion. 
4) Reject P2. 
 
I take the forth option to be the most promising one. Option 1 is too permissive. Emotional 
justification would on such a move not admit of defeaters. This is an undesirable option 
as it secures emotions a stronger epistemic role than we typically grant other sources of 
epistemic justification. Option 2, on the other hand, is too demanding. This option would 
mean that emotions can only justify evaluative beliefs when the agent holds separate 
(likely justified) beliefs, about the positive epistemic status of the reasons on which the 
emotion is based, for example, or about the reliability of their emotion. This would not 
only rule out outlaw emotions cases from involving direct justificatory roles, but any case 
where the agent lacked these further beliefs. In ruling such cases out, option 2 would risk 
denying the justificatory force of emotions altogether, as a purely emotional route for 
justification is blocked. The proponent of JV could accept the conclusion of my argument 
instead (option 3). They could rest content with the limits of their view and highlight that 
at least JV manages to secure outlaw emotions a justificatory role, that is, these emotions 
still provide prima facie justification to outlaw beliefs, despite the ultima facie 
justification of these beliefs being defeated by the conflicting oppressive beliefs. This 
would be an unsatisfying bullet to bite for proponents of JV, as outlaw emotion cases 
would always involve defeated outlaw beliefs. Indeed, proponents of JV have been 
reluctant to accept this concessionary conclusion (see Tappolet 2018). Accepting the 
Forthcoming in Ergo 
 17 
conclusion of my argument would in any case reveal JV to be far less suited to accounting 
for outlaw emotion cases than it has been assumed. Option 4 involves denying the premise 
that outlaw emotion cases involve rebutting defeaters. I take this to be the most promising 
option.17 To deny the conclusion of my argument then, a proponent of JV would need to 
deny that the conflicting oppressive beliefs in outlaw emotion cases are defeaters (P2). 
The main way of doing so, I take it, is to endorse the view that defeaters must have the 
positive epistemic status of being themselves justified, and then argue that the would-be 
defeating beliefs in outlaw emotion cases cannot act as defeaters because they are 
unjustified.  
 
This move comes in internalist and externalist varieties. Internalists typically take 
justification to depend only on facts about an agent’s non-factive mental states, while 
externalism denies this. Externalists take justification to depend at least partly on how 
things stand beyond the individual’s mental states.18 We are concerned with whether 
moves to deny the positive epistemic status of the would-be defeaters in outlaw emotion 
cases go through to allow a denial of P2. I will argue that moves open to the internalist 




                                                        
17 Indeed, it seems to be the one favoured by Tappolet (2018: 536).  
18 Note that here I am concerned with the justification of mental state defeaters, that is, with whether the 
oppressive propositions in outlaw emotion cases are justified. Despite mental state defeaters typically being the 
purview of internalist, as opposed to externalist, epistemologies, endorsement of defeating conditions on 
justification (that include mental state defeaters) is widespread amongst externalists (Alston 1988, Bergmann 
1997; Greco 2010).  
19 Strictly speaking these will be mixed or hybrid internalist-externalist accounts as mental state defeaters are 
granted. What makes the externalist move externalist is that the justification conferring features that grant 
mental state defeaters positive epistemic status are externalist. The relevant options of response from a 
proponent of JV are then either of purely internalist variety, or of hybrid internalist-externalist variety. I refer 
to the latter as the ‘externalist response’ for simplicity.  
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4.1. Denying P2: The Internalist  
An internalist response to my argument can be developed in two main ways. Either by 
adding a counterfactual internalist condition such that the conflicting belief comes out as 
unjustified, or by making a distinction between the reasons an agent has and the reasons 
an agent takes themselves to have. I will outline each response in turn and argue that they 
both face serious difficulties in delivering a denial of P2. As such, the externalist move 
will emerge as preferable.  
 
The first internalist move involves endorsing the condition that the oppressive 
propositions believed in outlaw emotion cases can only act as defeaters if they are ones 
that the agent would endorse had they had time to reflect. In other words, only beliefs that 
would have survived reflection are justified and hence can act as defeaters. The thought 
is that Raquel and the discontent housewife believe oppressive propositions that would 
not survive careful reflection. This move takes the would-be-defeating belief to be one 
whose epistemic status the agent herself is in a position to undermine. This is a 
problematic assumption.  
 
Recall, firstly, that Raquel and the discontent housewife both likely lack access to the 
reasons for their emotions. Reflection is likely to favour the conflicting oppressive 
proposition given that they inhabit, and have internalized, oppressive ideology. It is 
therefore unlikely that agents in outlaw emotion cases are in a position to reflectively 
undermine their oppressive beliefs. This means that the oppressive beliefs in outlaw 
emotion cases likely remain justified on this move. At the very least, this move will 
restrict the cases in which outlaw beliefs remain undefeated to the subset of cases in which 
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the agent could have reflectively undermined the relevant beliefs, resulting in a drastic 
restriction of those cases that JV would accommodate.  
 
To secure more than this, the counterfactual condition would have to be much stronger 
than one that invokes reflection, it would have to say something like this: Only conflicting 
beliefs that do not survive reflection, personal development, research, and collective 
consciousness raising efforts can defeat the justification of outlaw beliefs. This is likely 
far too demanding a counterfactual condition to endorse. First, invoking such a strong 
condition might seem ad hoc. That is, in so far as this move says that oppressive beliefs 
don’t count as defeaters if they would be undermined by a radically enlightened agent, 
the move invokes an idealized counterfactual condition designed to deliver the desired 
outcome: that oppressive beliefs be undermined. Most importantly, however, the move is 
actually ill-equipped to deliver its desired outcome. An internalist move of this sort 
assumes that the strong counterfactual condition is a scenario in which the would-be-
defeater would in fact be undermined by the enlightened agent. This need not be the case. 
It is possible that many of the oppressive propositions in outlaw emotion cases turn out 
to be internally justified after critical feminist reflection. The positive value of being a 
housewife, for example, might still be endorsed, perhaps for distinct reasons; but the 
proposition itself could remain justified in the counterfactual scenario, as it may not be 
disavowed by the ideally enlightened agent. It seems, therefore, that many oppressive 
propositions will remain justified, and hence apt to defeat the justification of outlaw 
beliefs, even on such a strong counterfactual condition. Finally, such a move seems to 
imply that any belief that one later disavows at t2 is not justified at t1, a consequence we 
may not sit well with. 
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A second internalist move would be to hold that in outlaw emotion cases, the agent really 
does have more (internal) reasons in favour of the emotion, despite this not being apparent 
to the agent herself. The thought is that the agent has most reason for the emotion, and 
hence the outlaw belief, than for the conflicting oppressive belief. The agent is just 
mistaken about what reasons she takes herself to have, such that she believes an internally 
unjustified proposition. As the oppressive proposition is internally unjustified it can’t act 
as a defeater against the emotion, and therefore the emotion can justify the associated 
belief in outlaw emotion cases.20 Discontent Housewife would, on this view, involve the 
housewife having most internal reason to be angered about her situation – given that she 
values her own independence and has professional ambitions, for example. But these 
reasons, that she has, are not accessible to her. Perhaps they have been psychologically 
repressed by her hostile social environment, such that she makes a mistake about what 
reasons she takes herself to have.  
 
An initial problem with this move is that it seems to face similar obstacles to the one just 
considered, for which reasons count as ones the agent has but lacks access to? Intuitive 
candidates seem to be exactly those reasons that one could have reasoned to, and over 
time realized that one has (see MacIntyre 1993). This move will therefore face the same 
worries as the one above. In addition to these however, this move claims that in outlaw 
emotion cases the agent really has, at the moment of experiencing the outlaw emotion, 
more reason in favour of the emotion than in favour of the conflicting oppressive belief. 
                                                        
20 This move is analogous to the one proposed by MacIntyre (1993) in arguing for rational akrasia. Put simply, 
she argues that akrasia can be rational when in acting against our best judgement we are actually acting in 
accordance with what we have most internal reason to do. Our best judgment, on her account, gets our reasons 
wrong because we don’t have full internal access to them. Tappolet (2016) adopts such an internalist move to 
account for emotion-based rational akrasia. It is likely she would endorse an analogous story in the epistemic 
case. It is, in any case, clear that Tappolet would attempt one of the justificatory moves I outline in section 4, 
as she claims that outlaw emotion cases do not involve defeaters because the would-be defeaters are unjustified 
(see Tappolet 2018: 536).  
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This doesn’t seem right. Of course, the agent must have some internal reason for the 
emotion, otherwise the occurrence of the emotion in that individual is entirely mysterious. 
But it would be a mistake to use this trivial fact to infer that the agent has more reason 
for her emotion than for the conflicting oppressive proposition, at least in so far as this is 
meant as a general account of what is going on in outlaw emotion cases. Outlaw emotions 
are exactly emotions that go against the agent’s web of internalized oppressive beliefs 
about the world. The conflicting oppressive belief is one component of the internalized 
worldview, and it therefore better coheres with the other beliefs, emotions, and intentions 
that stand in line with that framework. Such cases are best described as ones where the 
agent has most internal reason in favour of the oppressive conflicting proposition.21 This 
second move therefore seems to deny the initial set up of outlaw emotion cases.  
 
The internalist moves available to a proponent of JV seeking a denial of P2 then, either 
risk denying basic features of outlaw emotion cases, or result in a drastic restriction of 
those cases in which outlaw beliefs will remain undefeated (the subset of cases in which 
the internalist conditions are satisfied). Outlaw emotion cases seem to be best 
characterized as ones where considerations from the agent’s own point of view favour the 
oppressive proposition as opposed to the emotion, and hence where the oppressive 
propositions come out as internally justified. It seems unlikely then that an internalist 
story will be able to deliver on a denial of P2.  
 
                                                        
21 A similar problem would likely be faced by a mental state internalist attempt to deny that outlaw emotion 
cases involve defeaters. Mental state internalism holds that whether a proposition is justified depends on mental 
states the agent has but need not have access to. In outlaw emotion cases the agent has a larger set of mental 
states that stand in support of the oppressive proposition than of the outlaw emotion (including perceptual 
experiences, emotions, beliefs based on these, beliefs based on testimony, beliefs arising from reasoning from 
the oppressive information available etc.). For a mental state internalist move to successfully deny P2 it would 
have to overcome this. 
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4.2 Denying P2: The Externalist 
The discontent housewife believes that her place is in the home and holds a number of 
beliefs and intentions in line with this, as well as dispositions to feel emotions such as 
pride when she succeeds at fulfilling this role. What justifies her outlaw belief must be 
something about how things stand beyond the emoting agent. Indeed, it has been argued 
that externalism is the preferred epistemological framework for dealing with knowledge 
acquisition under conditions of oppression, as only facts external to the agent can deliver 
justified beliefs that go against oppressive ideology (Srinivasan, forthcoming).  
 
The external justification move takes the conflicting oppressive beliefs in outlaw emotion 
cases not to be defeaters on account of being externally unjustified. The thought is that 
living under conditions of oppression puts one systematically out of touch with truths, 
and compromises one’s belief-forming capacities relative to a certain domain, such that 
one is not reliably connected to facts within that domain (Srinivasan, forthcoming). 
Propositions of the sort ‘a women’s place is in the home’ are false and the product of the 
systematically misleading conditions of oppression. The processes that lead to belief in 
such propositions are unreliable, making these beliefs unjustified. The conflicting 
oppressive beliefs therefore cannot, according to this move, act as defeaters against the 
justification of outlaw beliefs. P2 is denied and the conclusion of my argument against 
JV is blocked.  
 
Although this is intuitively appealing, the externalist move is actually harder to establish 
than one might think. First, what seems to be driving the force of this move is a 
commitment to the falsity of the oppressive propositions, rather than any problem with 
the mechanism by which belief in them is arrived at. In arriving at the oppressive beliefs, 
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is the agent not treating the evidence available to her adequately, in a fashion that we 
would think reliably generates true beliefs had the beliefs been true? Is the agent not 
reasoning correctly from the testimony of otherwise reliable agents, and from her 
otherwise reliable empirical observation? It seems that the issue is not the reliability of 
her belief forming processes themselves, but the fact that the beliefs generated tend to be 
false. This is what gives us reason to think the belief forming processes involved must be 
unreliable.   
 
This seems to get something right, after all it is false ideology that outlaw emotions are 
thought to provide evidence against, and people living under conditions of oppression get 
things systematically wrong by believing all sorts of insidious falsities. But isn’t there a 
sense in which the proposition ‘a women’s place is in the home’ gets things right about 
the society in question? Similarly, isn’t there something true about propositions like, for 
example, ‘women are submissive’ and ‘women shave’ when believed within the context 
of patriarchal societies? Indeed, isn’t it exactly one of the features of such oppressive 
societies that stereotypes become self-fulling and self-perpetuating? Such considerations 
suggest that oppressive propositions can often be both justified and true. This calls into 
question the claim that oppressed individuals are unreliably connected to facts within the 
relevant domain. If oppressed individuals are reliably connected to oppressive facts, it 
seems plausible that, in being formed by the same belief-generating mechanisms, many 
false oppressive propositions may turn out to be justified despite their falsity. If this is the 
case, then it would seem that even the externalist attempt at denying P2 may fail, since 
the conflicting oppressive beliefs may still be justified and act as defeaters against the 
justification of outlaw beliefs.  
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Let me say a bit more on this possibility. The prevalence of self-fulling oppressive facts 
is widely acknowledged, and argued for, in feminist philosophy (Frye 1983; Mackinnon 
1987; Langton 2009; Haslanger 2011). McKinnon (1987), for example, writes that 
oppressive beliefs ‘become proven, in part because the world actually arranges itself to 
affirm what the powerful want to see’ (164). Similarly, for Langton (2009):  
 
When oppression is systematic enough, there is nothing accidental about a 
correlation between beliefs that women are servile, and women's servility; and the 
connection between beliefs and the truth of those beliefs can be as reliable as one 
could wish. (303) 
 
The thought is that oppressive propositions can be true and justified. This doesn’t mean 
that these beliefs are unproblematic, however, just that their failing is not semantic or 
epistemic. Langton takes self-fulling oppressive beliefs to not only be instrumentally 
harmful, but to constitute harms themselves. In a similar vein, Haslanger (2011) argues 
that generics like ‘women are submissive’ can be true, and beliefs based on them justified. 
Haslanger (2011) writes that:  
 
Under conditions of male dominance, women are, in fact, more submissive than 
men. This is a true generalization and those who live under male dominance are 
justified in believing it. (182) 
 
Haslanger locates the problem with oppressive generics not in their semantic truth value, 
as they adequately capture the way the social world happens to be arranged, but in their 
propensity to generate beliefs with normative or essentialist content. The descriptive 
generics should be resisted not for lacking epistemic credentials but because they tend to 
pragmatically imply, as opposed to logically imply, essentialist and normative 
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propositions which are both false and morally problematic. The descriptive proposition 
that ‘women are submissive’ might be true in patriarchal societies then, but that women 
should be, or are by nature, submissive is false. These normative and essentialist 
oppressive propositions are nonetheless, troublingly, justified, if formed by reliable 
belief-generating processes.22 For if many oppressive descriptive beliefs are true and 
justified, and the same belief-generating mechanisms are relied upon in the generation of 
related, normative, evaluative or essentialist, oppressive beliefs, then these are plausibly 
justified despite their falsity. This means that Raquel, and the discontent housewife, may 
be justified in believing normative and evaluative propositions such as ‘it is good for 
women to be in the home’, and ‘the man’s actions are flattering’ or ‘ok’, whether or not 
these are true. Once we take seriously the idea that reality is structured by oppression, the 
externalist move open to proponents of JV seems unlikely to succeed.  
 
In sum, the problem with the externalist move is that it assumes that oppressed agents are 
unreliably related to truths within a relevant domain. Raquel and the discontent 
housewife, on the externalist move, are unreliable knowers regarding gender relations. 
But if, as many feminist philosophers have argued, many oppressive propositions are in 
fact true, then oppressed agents do not seem to be unreliable knowers regarding the 
domain in question. Raquel, for example, is likely to hold a wide range of descriptive 
oppressive beliefs that are both justified and true (including for example the belief that 
‘unknown men squeeze women on nights out’). Raquel’s oppressive belief that ‘what the 
man did was ok’ is an evaluative or normative one however, and is false. But despite its 
                                                        
22 For Langton (2009) oppressive beliefs ‘can be self-verifying or self-fulfilling… if a belief is self-verifying, it 
provides evidence for itself (given a certain context). If it is self-fulfilling, it makes itself true (again, given a 
certain context). Beliefs that are self-verifying may be false, but justified: the evidence may be misleading, but 
being evidence, it supports the belief, even if the belief is false.’ (300) 
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falsity, Raquel’s oppressive belief may still be justified, as the state of affairs in the world 
provide evidence for it, and this evaluative belief was formed via the same belief-
formation process that reliably generated a wide range of true descriptive beliefs 
regarding gender relations. The evaluative beliefs with which outlaw emotions conflict 
then, although false, may well be justified. If this is the case, these beliefs can defeat the 
justification of outlaw beliefs. This leaves P2 standing and JV unable to deny that outlaw 
beliefs are defeated in outlaw emotion cases.  
 
5. Sketch of an Alternative 
I take the central intuition of the Justificatory View to get something right about outlaw 
emotion cases, namely that outlaw emotions provide justification for evaluative 
propositions. Outlaw emotions do not just lead indirectly to the (potential) justification 
of outlaw beliefs by motivating inquiry, as MV would have it. Outlaw emotions seem 
to themselves be capable of defeasibly justifying evaluative, albeit often vague, beliefs. 
I have argued that the Justificatory View, as it stands, struggles to account for a 
satisfying justificatory role in outlaw emotion cases. I will sketch an alternative 
justificatory view that can deliver on a denial of P2. Given space constraints this will 
be a rough sketch, but it will, I think, prove the most promising direction to pursue in 
providing an account of the justificatory role of outlaw emotions.  
 
When we take ideology seriously, I have suggested that it isn’t easy to establish that 
the would-be defeater in outlaw emotion cases is unjustified. My sketch of an 
alternative way of denying P2 will not hinge on denying the would-be-defeater its 
epistemic standing as justified.  To begin with, I will assume a form of externalism of 
the sort arrived at above. An externalism that takes ideological propositions to often 
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be true and justified is one that properly maps a troubling feature of life and knowledge 
under conditions of oppression. In line with this, and externalism in general, I will 
assume some form of epistemic reliabilism, where a belief is justified if it is produced 
by a process that reliably generates true beliefs. According to my view, emotion-based 
beliefs, as well as beliefs arrived at non-emotionally, via authoritative testimony or 
deliberation, for example, are reliably formed, as these processes are reliable at 
generating true beliefs.23 The question is why the conflicting oppressive belief doesn’t 
defeat the justification of the outlaw belief.  
 
My alternative story for why this is so involves combining the insights of reliabilism 
and feminist standpoint epistemology.24 Being informed by a social epistemology 
seems prima facie promising in dealing with outlaw emotion cases given that JV and 
MV failed to incorporate social components into their accounts. Here I sketch how 
such an account might be developed using insights from standpoint epistemology in 
particular. A consideration of standpoint epistemology lies beyond the scope of this 
paper.25 For our purposes we will take the main insight from standpoint epistemology 
to be the claim that oppressed individuals are in a position of epistemic privilege 
regarding their own oppression. The claim is not that being a member of an oppressed 
group is necessary or sufficient to gaining knowledge about the relevant domain of 
oppression, but rather that oppressed groups are better positioned to gain knowledge 
about their oppression given their particular social standing.26 This is because social 
                                                        
23 Any reliabilist account of the epistemology of emotions will have to provide an argument for the reliability 
of emotions. I do not have space to do so here. See Brun et al. (2008), Pelser (2014) and Sreenivasan (2018) for 
arguments to this effect.  
24 That reliabilism and standpoint epistemology are particularly compatible has been noted by Kitcher (1994),  
Michaelian (2008) and Srinivasan (forthcoming).  
25 On standpoint epistemology see Hartsock (1983), Harding (2004), and Toole forthcoming. 
26 What specific features of one’s social position grant epistemic privilege? Marxist standpoint epistemologists 
take women’s contact with the material conditions of reproductive labour to underlie their epistemic privilege 
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positions make a difference to what reasons agents have, as well as their dispositions 
to recognize reasons as reasons (Toole forthcoming).  
 
What seems natural to suggest then, is that one’s social standing makes one a more 
reliable truth tracker relative to a certain domain. So, women will more reliably track 
the reality of society’s gender relations, while people of colour will more reliably track 
truths regarding racial relations. Reliability here is comparative, the oppressed are 
more reliable, as compared to those who are not oppressed, at tracking truths relative 
to a relevant domain.27 Kitcher (1994) has made a similar point and says that 
‘reliabilists should insist that some standpoints are better or worse than others with 
respect to certain types of propositions’ (125). 28 This gives us the following reliability 
claim about social positions:  
 
Standpoint Reliability (SR): Oppressed individuals are more reliable at 
generating true beliefs regarding particular domain(s) of oppression.  
 
                                                        
regarding gender oppression. Most contemporary standpoint epistemologies have, however, moved away from 
strict materialist readings centered around labour and ground the epistemic privilege of groups in a wider set 
of relations they bear to surrounding social conditions and how these structure their experience (Fricker 1999; 
Dotson 2012; Toole forthcoming). These features characterize social positions from which standpoints can be 
more readily achieved. Standpoints themselves are collective identities or consciousnesses that constitute 
political achievements arrived at through collective struggle.  
27 There are, of course, many ways in which oppressed groups are epistemically disadvantaged. The 
internalization of oppressive beliefs about one’s own identity group can breed false consciousness and 
complicity, and oppressed groups suffer hermeneutical injustices (Fricker 2007), whereby a lack of shared 
resources for social interpretation compromises their ability to make sense of their own oppression 
(compromising their ability to make sense of their outlaw emotions). These real and widespread epistemic 
disadvantages are not incompatible with standpoint epistemology’s main insight. It is consistent to grant both 
that oppressed groups are epistemically oppressed in a myriad of ways, while also granting their epistemic 
privilege, compared to dominant groups, in being more capable of achieving progressive standpoints with 
regards to their own oppression.  
28 Kitcher uses the word ‘standpoint’ where I mean ‘social position’, see fn 26. I label the claims of my sketched 
alternative view ‘standpoint’ to indicate that they are informed by a standpoint epistemology, rather than 
because they refer to standpoints themselves.  
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Outlaw emotions are one relevant type of experience that can generate beliefs. Jaggar 
(1989) notes that ‘people who experience conventionally unacceptable, or what I call 
'outlaw' emotions often are subordinated individuals who pay a disproportionately high 
price for maintaining the status quo’ (166). Outlaw emotions are sensitive to reasons 
that oppressed agents are in a privileged position to access. This is partly because one’s 
dispositions to experience particular emotions depends on one’s social standing. Social 
positions will, therefore, dispose agents to be sensitive to particular reasons. One type 
of belief-generating process by which oppressed individuals are more reliable at 
generating true beliefs (SR) then, is emotional. As Kitcher (1994) says ‘the claim that 
a particular standpoint is preferable to others can thus be recast in terms of the relative 
reliability of the processes that different standpoints make available’ (124). This gives 
us a second claim:  
 
Standpoint Emotions (SE): Occupying a particular social position makes one 
more emotionally sensitive to particular reasons.  
 
Outlaw emotions are one of the belief-generating processes made more readily 
available by occupying a particular social position. This is because doing so will 
dispose one to greater sensitivity to certain reasons for emotions (SE). Emotions are, 
however, not the only belief-generating processes that social positions make available. 
A doxastic version of SE is likely true as well. That is, occupying a particular social 
position makes one more sensitive to particular epistemic reasons too. It is plausible 
that members of oppressed groups are also more reliable at generating true beliefs 
about their oppression (compared to dominant groups), through other means, such as 
reasoning, for example. Do we have reason to think that emotions constitute a 
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particularly reliable belief-forming process, within agents that occupy privileged 
social positions? Indeed, we might.  
 
Briefly, emotional processes are typically taken to be informationally encapsulated 
(De Sousa 1987; Faucher and Tappolet 2006; Majeed 2019). Recalcitrant emotions are 
a common feature of everyday life, where our emotional experiences seem to ignore, 
or at least take greater time to respond to, conflicting evidence. This uncontroversial 
feature of emotions makes them particularly good at picking up on reasons in the 
presence of conflicting information, beliefs, and emotions. This means that emotions 
can often aid reasoning by responding to reasons despite what the agent already 
believes (see Majeed 2019). This seems particularly useful in outlaw emotion cases 
where the agent holds a number of beliefs that conflict with the outlaw emotion. This 
informational encapsulation plausibly grants emotions a more reliable connection to 
true beliefs in outlaw emotion cases, as they are a belief-generating mechanism that is 
particularly immune to the agent’s wider set of beliefs. This gives us: 
 
Emotional Reliability (ER): Emotions are often more reliable than non-
emotional processes at generating true beliefs under conditions of oppression.  
 
Beliefs based on emotions, then, are likely generated by a more informationally 
encapsulated process than beliefs arrived at through reasoning, or based on testimony. 
We have seen that one intuitive way of making sense of SR is to cash out the reliability 
of social positions in terms of the reliability of the belief-generating-processes they 
make available. Emotions constitute one such belief generating process. This gave us 
SE, the claim that social positions make us more prone to track particular reasons 
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through emotional experiences. ER states something further, that within the processes 
made available by a privileged position, emotions may constitute a particularly reliable 
belief-generating process given that they respond to reasons in a manner that is more 
encapsulated from an agent’s wider set of beliefs than other belief-generating 
mechanisms.  
 
The outlaw emotion cases that we have been concerned with involve agents that, 
according to SR, occupy privileged positions relative to domains of oppression. 
Discontent Housewife and Harassment both involve women living under conditions 
of gender oppression. According to SE, they are therefore agents whose social position 
will have played a role in disposing them to experience outlaw emotions. Furthermore, 
given ER, their emotions are often more reliable at generating true beliefs than other 
belief generating processes. The conflicting oppressive beliefs in these cases are, 
however, also generated by processes available to agents occupying privileged 
position, after all Raquel and the discontent housewife hold those oppressive beliefs 
despite being, following SR, in a position of epistemic privilege.  
 
Why doesn’t the oppressive belief defeat the justification of the outlaw belief in such 
cases? Appeal to ER alone is insufficient in answering this question and delivering a 
rejection of P2. First, ER doesn’t differentiate between those emotions that go against 
prevailing ideology and those that do not. Raquel’s conflicting oppressive belief may 
have been generated by feelings of pride or flattery. If this is the case, Raquel’s 
oppressive belief and her outlaw belief alike, will be equally reliably formed, and we 
have made no headway denying that the oppressive belief is a defeater. Furthermore, 
a denial of P2 based solely on ER would likely say that because emotions are often 
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more reliable under conditions of oppression, they are immune to defeaters. This is an 
undesirable outcome however, as it would block beliefs formed emotionally from ever 
being defeated by beliefs that are formed via other processes, reasoning, or perception, 
for example.  
 
I propose that we need to make reference to the content of the beliefs in question, rather 
than merely the processes that generate them, in a denial of P2. Specifically, we need 
to make reference to which social positions beliefs in particular propositions most 
typically arise in. Following SR, women are more reliable knowers than men regarding 
gender oppression. So, women are more likely than men to form the outlaw belief that 
Raquel forms. I propose to deny P2 by appealing to the fact that belief in the conflicting 
oppressive proposition occurs disproportionately in members of groups that lack 
epistemic privilege, as compared to those that have epistemic privilege relative to that 
domain. The thought is that the conflicting beliefs in outlaw emotion cases are not 
defeaters because they are less reliably connected to truth than the outlaw beliefs. 
Outlaw beliefs are more reliable because they have propositional content that is more 
likely to feature in the beliefs of those who occupy a position of epistemic privilege 
relative to that domain. The claim is that only beliefs that are justified and whose 
propositional content features disproportionately amongst those that have privilege 
relative to the relevant domain can defeat the justification of outlaw beliefs.  
 
This is different to the way in which the externalist move considered above attempted 
to deny P2. The externalist move above denied oppressive beliefs justification. On my 
sketch the oppressive conflicting proposition is typically justified. The conflicting 
belief is, however, less reliable than the outlaw belief and therefore cannot defeat it. 
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But this is not due to the belief having been formed by a defective process. This is 
because the proposition believed is more likely to be shared by agents that are less 
reliably connected to truth, due to not occupying a position of epistemic privilege 
relative to the domain of oppression in question. The sketched account is also different 
from the internalist way of denying P2, where appeal to reasoning is made. On my 
sketch the agent need not have the ability to herself undermine the would-be defeater, 
as features external to the agent’s reasoning capacities determine the justification of 
her beliefs. Structural features of society underlie why oppressive beliefs do not defeat 
the justification of outlaw beliefs.  
 
Note that, on this account, members of dominant/privileged groups can also experience 
outlaw emotions that provide immediate justification for outlaw beliefs that remain 
undefeated by conflicting oppressive beliefs. Membership of an epistemically 
privileged group is not itself a condition that must be satisfied on my account. 
Additionally, the account excludes racist or sexist emotions from providing 
justification to oppressive evaluative propositions. Imagine a scenario where 
egalitarian principles are dominant, and an agent experiences, for example, an emotion 
of disgust towards a particular social group that conflicts with their explicitly 
egalitarian beliefs. In such cases, the conflicting egalitarian beliefs act as defeaters 
against the justification of beliefs based on this disgust, for they more adequately 
reflect the beliefs that characterize epistemically privileged positions relative to the 
relevant domain.29  
                                                        
29 What about unfitting outlaw emotions? On my sketch, an unfitting outlaw emotion can provide justification 
for false evaluative beliefs so long as the conflicting beliefs aren’t more reliably formed. This means that if 
Raquel was actually squeezed accidentally, by a visually impaired man, her anger might still provide justification 
to the evaluative belief that what he did was not ok, as this proposition features disproportionately in the beliefs 
of groups with epistemic privilege relative to a certain domain, and would therefore not be defeated by the 
conflicting belief. Raquel’s belief would in this case be justified despite its falsity. This shouldn’t give us cause 
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6. Conclusion 
I have argued that existing accounts of the epistemic role of emotions are ill-equipped, 
as they currently stand, to account for the epistemic role of outlaw emotions,30 and I 
have provided a sketch that points in what I take to be the most promising direction to 
remedy this.31 We saw that an adequate account of the motivational epistemic role of 
outlaw emotions is likely to require inclusion of insights from social epistemology. A 
modified account of this sort would, however, still find it difficult to deliver on the 
assumption that outlaw beliefs are justified. JV, on the other hand, seemed particularly 
well suited to account for a more direct justificatory role than MV allowed, but the 
view could not block oppressive beliefs from defeating the justification of outlaw 
beliefs in outlaw emotion cases. I provided an initial sketch of a view that takes steps 
towards remedying this. For those proponents of JV happy to accept the view I arrive 
at, my sketched alternative will count as a specific version of their view. For those 
married to perceptual analogies or internalist commitments, however, my alternative 
may count as a rivalling view to theirs.  
 
                                                        
for worry however, as it just means that unfitting outlaw emotions, much like unfitting everyday emotions, can 
sometimes provide justification for false beliefs. Unfitting emotions of all sorts can, on JV and MV as well, 
sometimes provide (or uncover) justification for false beliefs.  
30 I have been concerned with whether existing accounts of the epistemology of emotions can deliver on the 
assumption, present in this literature, that outlaw beliefs are justified. There may of course be further, perhaps 
crucial, epistemic roles that outlaw emotions play beyond providing (according to JV) or uncovering (according 
to MV) justification for outlaw beliefs. What these further epistemic roles might be is a topic for future work 
(see fn.14).  
31 I have focused on outlaw emotions occurring under conditions of oppression. What about those outlaw 
emotions that occur under different conditions? I have suggested above that my sketch looks promising 
regarding its ability to cope with inverted cases (where oppressive outlaw emotions conflict with egalitarian 
ideology). Working out the specifics of this is a topic for future work. What about cases that are not directly 
related to ideology, such as a devoted nature-lover who experiences negative outlaw emotions whenever they 
are in the great outdoors? I think it is likely that these cases will be more easily accommodated by existing 
externalist frameworks than cases that involve structural ideology. This is because cases that do not involve 
ideology will be unlikely to involve self-fulfilling externally justified beliefs with which the outlaw emotion 
conflicts. Further investigation into these widespread and interesting cases is a topic for future work. 
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In conclusion, we have seen that the assumption in the philosophy of emotion literature 
that existing accounts of the epistemology of emotion are well-equipped to deliver 
justified outlaw beliefs in outlaw emotion cases, faces unacknowledged obstacles. 
Although I have not argued for a desideratum claim here, if it were a desideratum of 
any epistemology of emotions that they deliver justified outlaw beliefs, my argument 
would suggest recommendations for the epistemology of emotions beyond outlaw 
emotion cases.32 First, it would suggest that reliabilist versions of JV hold greater 
plausibility than phenomenalist versions. If externalist accounts of JV are better placed 
to account for outlaw emotion cases, and accounting for these cases is a desideratum 
of an epistemology of emotions, then we would have reason to favour externalist 
accounts of the epistemology of emotions in general. Second, I mentioned that JV is 
most commonly endorsed by perceptual theorists of emotion. The moves to save JV 
open to a proponent working broadly within a perceptual framework faced serious 
problems (as seen in section 4). Appeal to a standpoint epistemology, I have argued, 
promises to fare better. This move to a social epistemology framework, if held in 
conjunction with a desideratum claim, would suggest that a departure from perceptual 
analogies in the epistemology of emotions in general might be called for.  
 
Many details of the proposed positive account remain to be fleshed out, and problems 
inherited from adopting a reliabilist, and standpoint, epistemology will have to be 
addressed.33 Even if my alternative proves unsuccessful, I have brought forth an 
                                                        
32 Note that we might not think outlaw emotions call for the same type of epistemic account as non-outlaw 
emotions, such that endorsement of a desideratum claim does not immediately follow from my argument that 
existing accounts struggle to accommodate them.  
33 My sketch, much like existing accounts, does not provide an account for how emoting agents themselves 
might distinguish between fitting and unfitting outlaw emotions. Indeed, we saw that this capacity is likely to 
be compromised in such cases. Additionally, much like the existing accounts critiqued, my sketch does not 
distinguish between which token emotions are fitting or unfitting from a third-personal perspective either. I 
have made use of evocative example cases where the outlaw emotions are fitting throughout the paper, but my 
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unacknowledged problem in the epistemology of emotion and mapped the main moves 
that can be made in response to it. This invites proponents of rivaling, and sympathetic, 
views alike to make moves towards the provision of an adequate account of the 
epistemic role of outlaw emotions. The provision of such an account has until now not 



















                                                        
proposal, much like those I critique, does not presuppose that emotions must be fitting so as to play epistemic 
roles (see fn.6 and 29). Thank you to an anonymous referee for prompting me to consider the relevance of 
veridicality. 
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